Why sanctions?
Universal-jurisdiction prosecutions are slow. Sanctions are not. Magnitsky-style asset freezes and travel bans on named perpetrators — judges, prison wardens, IRGC commanders, FARAJA commanders — impose immediate personal costs, signal to mid-ranking officials that their participation will be remembered, and create a paper trail for future trials.
Named perpetrators
The following officials have been publicly named by the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, Amnesty International, Iran Human Rights (IHR), and HRANA. Most are already under EU and/or UK sanctions; few are under US sanctions; almost none are under Canadian or Australian sanctions.
- Ali Khamenei — Supreme Leader. Ultimate authority over the IRGC, judiciary and Guardian Council. Sanctioned: US, UK.
- Hossein Salami — IRGC Commander-in-Chief since 2019. Sanctioned: EU, UK.
- Gholamreza Soleimani — Basij Commander. Sanctioned: EU, UK.
- Ahmadreza Radan — FARAJA Chief since January 2023. Oversees the Guidance Patrol and the 2024 Noor Plan. Sanctioned: EU, UK.
- Gholamhossein Mohseni-Eje'i — Head of Judiciary since 2021. Personally signed off on multiple protester death sentences. Sanctioned: EU, UK.
- Abolghasem Salavati — "Judge of Death" of Tehran Revolutionary Court Branch 15. Sanctioned: EU, UK, US.
- Mohammad Moghisseh — Tehran Revolutionary Court Branch 28. Assassinated January 2024 but estate-relevant for civil claims.
- Esmail Khatib — Minister of Intelligence (Etela'at). Sanctioned: EU, UK.
- Mohammad Mehdi Tahranchi — Tehran Province Governor during 2022 protest crackdown. Not yet sanctioned by Five Eyes.
- Hassan Karami — Commander of FARAJA Special Units. Not yet sanctioned by US or Canada.
This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. The UN Fact-Finding Mission's confidential annex names hundreds of mid-ranking officials; ask your foreign ministry to act on it.
Letter templates
To a UK Member of Parliament
Dear [MP name],
I am writing as your constituent to ask you to press the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office to expand UK sanctions under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 to cover all officials named in the March 2024 report of the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran.
The current UK list omits, in particular, FARAJA Special Units commander Hassan Karami and several Tehran Revolutionary Court judges responsible for the death sentences of Mohsen Shekari, Majidreza Rahnavard, Mohammad Mehdi Karami and Seyed Mohammad Hosseini.
I would be grateful if you could (1) table a written question to the Foreign Secretary asking when these designations will be made, and (2) write to the Foreign Secretary on my behalf.
Yours sincerely,
[Your name and address]
To a US Senator or Representative
Dear Senator/Representative [name],
I am a constituent in [state/district]. I am writing to urge you to support full implementation of the Mahsa Amini Human Rights and Security Accountability Act and to press the Department of State and OFAC to designate all officials named in the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Iran's March 2024 report under Executive Order 13553 and the Global Magnitsky Act.
Specifically, US sanctions still omit FARAJA Special Units commander Hassan Karami and several Tehran Revolutionary Court judges. I would be grateful for a written response indicating your position.
Sincerely,
[Your name and address]
To a Member of the European Parliament
Dear MEP [name],
I am writing to ask you to push the Council to expand restrictive measures against Iran (Council Decision (CFSP) 2011/235) to cover all officials named in the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran's March 2024 report.
I would also urge you to support a Parliament resolution calling on the Council to formally designate the IRGC as a terrorist organisation, in line with the Parliament's January 2023 vote.
Yours sincerely,
[Your name and address]
Other things you can do
- Donate to documentation NGOs — Donate.
- Share named victims on social media — In Memoriam.
- Print and post the classroom poster — Poster.
How a designation actually works
“Sanctions” covers several different instruments with different effects, and campaigning is more effective when the ask is specific. A request to “sanction Iran” achieves little; a request to designate a named commander under a named legal instrument can be answered.
| Instrument | Jurisdiction | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 | United Kingdom | Asset freeze and travel ban on named individuals and entities |
| Global Magnitsky Act / Executive Order 13553 | United States | Blocking of property, visa bar, secondary exposure for those who transact with the designee |
| Council Decision 2011/235/CFSP (Iran human rights regime) | European Union | Asset freeze, travel ban, export ban on repression equipment |
| Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act | Canada | Asset freeze and inadmissibility |
| Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 | Australia | Targeted financial sanctions and travel bans |
| Terrorist proscription | UK, Canada, others (pending for the IRGC in several states) | Criminalises membership, funding and support; far wider effect than an asset freeze |

Where the gaps are
The single most useful thing a constituent letter can do is name a specific gap. The pattern across jurisdictions is consistent: the EU and UK have designated most of the visible command layer, the US covers the top of the chain and the judiciary unevenly, and Canada and Australia lag on everyone below the ministerial level.
| Category of perpetrator | Well covered | Commonly missing |
|---|---|---|
| Supreme Leader and ministers | US, UK, EU | Australia |
| IRGC and Basij commanders | EU, UK | US listings for regional commanders; Canada |
| Revolutionary Court judges | EU, UK for the best known names | Branch judges who issued individual death sentences |
| Prison governors and interrogators | Partially, EU/UK | Almost entirely absent from Five Eyes lists |
| Provincial FARAJA and Special Unit commanders | EU | US, Canada, Australia |
| Entities: prisons, courts, media outlets airing forced confessions | EU, UK | US and Canada in most cases |
The IRGC proscription question
Proscription is a different order of measure from an asset freeze: it criminalises membership, funding and material support, and reaches the network of companies and charities through which the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps operates abroad. The United States designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation in April 2019. Canada followed in June 2024. The United Kingdom has repeatedly signalled intent without acting; the European Parliament has voted for proscription in non-binding resolutions since January 2023, while the Council has not moved. The UK proscription campaign is the most active current route for supporters in Britain. Background on the organisation is on the IRGC entry.
What an individual can realistically do
- Write to your own representative, not a foreign one. Foreign ministries respond to their own legislature; a letter from a non-constituent is filed and not counted.
- Name one perpetrator and one instrument. “Designate Hassan Karami under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020” can be answered; “do more about Iran” cannot.
- Ask for a written question. A tabled parliamentary question creates a dated public record that NGOs can cite and follow up.
- Ask about the confidential annex. The UN Fact-Finding Mission holds a list of officials it has not published; asking whether your government has requested it is a concrete, answerable question.
- Adopt a prisoner. Named individual advocacy has demonstrably produced stays of execution — see the detainee advocacy campaign.
- Keep the record. Publish the reply you receive. Non-answers are evidence too.

What sanctions do not do
Honesty about limits makes the case stronger. Targeted designations do not remove officials from office, do not reach assets held in China, Russia, Turkey or the Gulf, and are routinely evaded through relatives and front companies. They are also frequently confused by the public with broad economic sanctions on Iran, which have very different effects and fall largely on ordinary Iranians. The argument for individual designations is narrower and more defensible: they raise the personal cost of participation, they document a chain of command while witnesses are alive, and they build the evidentiary base that universal-jurisdiction prosecutions later rely on. The prosecution of former prison official Hamid Nouri in Sweden in 2022 rested on exactly that kind of accumulated record.
Frequently asked questions
Do targeted sanctions hurt ordinary Iranians?
Targeted human-rights designations apply to named individuals and entities — commanders, judges, prison officials — through asset freezes and travel bans. They are distinct from broad economic sanctions on Iran’s oil, banking and trade sectors, which have far wider effects on the population.
Is the IRGC a proscribed terrorist organisation?
It is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the United States since April 2019 and listed as a terrorist entity by Canada since June 2024. The United Kingdom and the European Union have not proscribed it, despite repeated parliamentary votes urging them to.
Which officials are still unsanctioned?
Coverage is thinnest for provincial Special Unit commanders, individual Revolutionary Court branch judges who issued protest death sentences, prison governors and interrogators. Canada and Australia lag furthest behind the EU and UK lists.
Does writing to a politician change anything?
Individually, rarely. In volume and when specific, measurably yes: designations of Iranian officials in 2022–2023 followed sustained constituent and parliamentary pressure, and tabled written questions create a public record that campaigners can pursue.
What is the UN Fact-Finding Mission’s confidential annex?
The Mission’s March 2024 report was accompanied by an unpublished list of individuals it identified as responsible for violations. Governments can request it, and asking whether yours has done so is a concrete question for a representative to answer.

